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11. Regionα11ntegrlαtionαsαn lmpediment of Security? 
1 assume that 0ぽicialactivities in international relations can take 
place at five levels. These are: international institutions operating 
at the global level; regions above sovereign states or other polities; 
the sovereign states or other polities themselves; regions below the 
sovereign states or other polities; and local communities. Four of 
these five levels are less than global， define collective identities and 
demarcate them泊 moreor less loose terms. In the course of the 
twentieth century， actors in， and theorists of， international relations 
have been concerned with these four levels of regionality or region-
alness unequally.2 The sovereign states or similar types of polities 
have attracted most attention， even where they were contested， and 
the largest number of activities in international relations has been 
launched from the level of the sovereign states. This is the empiri-
cal background against which，仕omthe turn of the twentieth cen-
tury， realists have devised their theoretical position that states are 
paramount actors in international relations. However， this position 
is untenable when applied 加 previousperiods of history and Euro-
centric when related to the experiences of population groups outside 
??
??
Europe and North America. 
The level of regionality or regionalness that has been neglected 
most in its impacts on international relations is that of regions 
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above and below the sovereign states or other polities. Between the 
end of World War 1 and the end of the 1980s， most international 
theorists concerned with these levels of regionality or regionalness 
have assumed that the formation of institutions above or schemes of 
cooperation among sovereign states as aspects of regional in加gra-
tion emerged in Europe only during the immediate postwar period， 
were rare in earlier parts of the twentieth century and unknown in 
Europe as well as to the world at large in previous centuries.3 But 
this assumption is far from true. The sole reason that it could have 
existed is the lack of historical interest on the part of the theorists 
Up until the superimposition of European colonial domination in Af-
rica， South and Southeast Asia as well as Oceania in the course of 
the nineteenth century， the world was a world of regions， and no・
tions of statehood played only a marginal role. Some of these re-
gions came也知 existencethrough the use of force， such as the ex-
panded Qing Chinese Empire of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies，4 the Russian Empire which was expanded to the Pacific 
coasts， Central Asia and the Black Sea in the course of the eight咽
eenth and nineteenth centuries，" the Ottoman Turkish Empire 
which was no longer expanding during the eighteenth century but， 
in many areas， was successfully defended against external pres制
sure; the Spanish colonial empire in America which was extended 
旬 includemuch of California in the eighteenth century，7 the 
Mughal Empire in India8 or the empires of the Ashanti; DahomeylO 
and the Zulu" which emerged during the eighteenth and early nine-
centuries. Other regions were integrated through 
peaceful means， mainly the acceptance of common legal norms and 
rules， the exchange of goods and the practice of cooperation among 
rulers. This was not only the case in central， western and southern 
Europe during the eighteenth century'2 but also in the Interlacus-
trine area of East A企icaduring the eighteenth and nineteenth cen・
who studied regional integration. 
more teenth 
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turies，"l among the polities joined into the “Kula Ring" in the Pacific 
by the nineteenth century if not before，t' and institutions estab-
lished among Native Americans such as the Iroquois League of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries." 
That is to say that. regional institutions and schemes for regional 
cooperation have a much longer tradition than most of the sover幽
eign states that exist today. The same applies to institutions of gov-
ernance at levels of regionalness below the sovereign states. Often 
these institutions are successors to polities with a tradition longer 
than that of sovereign states and with population groups sharing a 
collective identity stronger than the population groups that make 
up the group of citizens of subsequent sovereign states. There were 
three processes that reduced the significance of these institutions 
and schemes:白rstthe globalisation of the European international 
system through imperialist colonialism at the turn of the twentieth 
century; second， the simultaneous creation and strengthening of in-
ternational institutions; and， third， the conceptualisation and estab-
lishment of national states in the course of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Imperialist colonialism was detrimental to re凶
gional institutions and schemes for regional integration because it 
created or enhanced demands for global military， economic， political 
and cultural competition. This strate白Twas pursued by military 
planners， business leaders， diplomats and other decision-makers in 
government who displayed their readiness to perceive international 
relations as under the impact of global conflict and strove to ana-
lyse global interdependencies among actions of governments， armed 
forces and the various business communities.16 The pursuit of peace 
through global international organisation was positioned against re幽
gional integration because regional institutions appeared to obstruct 
global cooperation under the goal of accomplishing peace in the 
world. Activists of the international peace movement， some journal-
ists and non-partisan intellectuals favoured his strategy for the pur-
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pose of counterbalancing the politics of imperialistic expansion， and 
advocated the promotion of world organisation through world organ-
isations.口 Nationalismwas inimical to institutions and schemes of 
regional integTation because it favou1'ed statemaking and nation-
building at the expense of communication among neighbours within 
a region. Nationalists assumed that international state boundaries 
were significant dividing lines in military， economic， political and 
cultural respects， advocated the fortification of these boundaries in 
service of the pe1'ceived security of the states which they st1'ove to 
organise as autonomous self-sufficient entities， and they demanded 
that the boundaries of the states should overlap with the areas each 
of which were inhabited by only one group that was perceivable as 
a single， homogeneous， social coherent and politically uniform n会
tion.18 Nationalists could perceive 1'elations with neighbours in the 
region me1'ely unde1' the guidance of powe1' politics and were fearful 
that 1'egional integration could weaken the defense capability， make 
the governments of sovereign states subject to political and eco・
nomic pressures at the hands of their neighbours and thereby in・
c1'ease the vulnerability of the sovel'eign states. Keeping close watch 
ove1' the population of the state unde1' its cont1'ol was 1'ega1'ded as 
the prime government task as the lack of government capability to 
pl'ovide fo1' domestic stability could jeopa1'dise the exte1'nal security 
of the state.19 The1'efol'e， the 1'egional concerns that were considel'ed 
to be possible by the nationalists were focused on the exercise of 
powel' by one government over its neighbouring states， such as the 
designs that we1'e ensh1'ined in the Ge1'man Mitteleuropαpolicies.剖
Hence， while impel'ialism and colonialism p1'omoted competition and 
global internationalism sought to absorb states and regions into the 
futu1'e world community， nationalism was divisive and prioritised 
the self-sufficience of the sovereign states. But global international-
ism and nationalism shared the common belief that the world as a 
whole togethe1' with the national states 1'epresented 01' should 1'epre-
sent integ1'ated and well-"functioning" o1'ganisms whe1'ein the whole 
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was larger than the sum of its parts and wherein the operations of 
al parts were considered to have to be supportive to the whole.21 
Hence the political language of nineteenth-釘ldearly twentieth-
century internationalists as well as nationalists abounded with bi-
ologistic metaphors drawn on the model of the living body. Likewise， 
international boundaries were likened to the skin of the state， inte-
grating al units in the state while sealing off the state against its 
environment，2 and the entire world was equated with the compre-
hensive system that could “organise" relations among specific units 
and integrate them血toan overarching superstructure.23 Therefore， 
global internationalists as well as nationalists could easily agree 
that institutions and schemes of regional integration were danger-
ous because they ignored the purported“national desires and pas-
sions" and obstructed the integration of出eworld凶 oonly one sin-
gle international system. Both parties could then easily denounce 
institutions and schemes of regional integration as part of the dusty 
legacy of Ancien Regime mechanicism.24 If regions were conceivable 
at al in biologistic terms， they did so as the fertile ground on which 
nations as well as international organization could “groW".25 
Consequently， most twentieth-centUIγinternational relations theo-
rists have had a distanced relationship with regional integration. 
Realists ignored it because it was dangerous for the state.26 Func-
tionalists as theorists ignored it because it was dangerous for global 
integration.27 Functionalists in office made efforts to prevent it.28 Al・
though neofunctionalists shifted the focus of their theoretical inquir-
ies仕omglobal to regional integration， they conceived regional inte-
gration solely as a process of the absorption of national states into 
larger polities29 but remained skeptical about the likelihood of the 
success of regional integr叫ionprocesses.80 The neofunctionalist ap-
proach had immensely negative consequences for the regional inte-
gration processes of the 1950s and 1960s because it suggested that 
the degree of success of regional integration should be measurable 
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according to the ascertainable capability of regional institutions to 
“incorporate" institutions of existing sovereign national states. As 
most regional integration processes of the time displayed few ascer-
tainable results of“spill over" e佐ctsof state bureaucratic decision-
making onto the advancement of regional integration theorists 
passed negative verdicts on the work of regional institutions. Bu-
reaucrats and political decision幽makersfollowed suit and began to 
bicker over relative gains and losses on the various sides of the par-
ties involved in regional integration processes. ln Latin America， 
these disputes contributed to the collapse of institutions of regional 
integration in the course of the 1960s，31 in East A企ica，the East M-
rican Community， which had been modelled on the European Eco・
nomic Community of the 1950s， ceased to operate in the 1970s and 
was formally dissolved in 1984.32 Moreover， neofunctionalism ap-
pealed primarily to political and administrative elites who tended to 
conceptualise regional integration as a process of inter-government 
negotiation and accommodation among sovereign states without 
taking seriously popular attitudes and perceptions.33 The conse-
quence of this bias was that regional integration could hardly pro-
ceed if disagreement arose among the governments involved. For 
e玄ample，when Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere refused to sit at 
the same table with Ugandan leader ldi Amin after the latter had 
seized power through a military coup-d'etat in 1971， the East A企i・
can Community could no longer proceed. 
Whereas neofunctionalist theory and its practical application re-
mained unconcerned with security issues， realist opposition against 
regional integration was fed by security concerns. Realists were co距
tractualists who tied the legitimacy of a government to the exis-
tence of a sovereign population group within the boundaries of a 
state.34 Hence realists assumed that it was the legitimate task of 
governments to provide for the security of the population under 
their control. Therefore， within the confines of realist theory， gov-
???
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ernments were to be sole providers of security， domestically against 
crime and other disturbances and internationally against threats 
from other states， and security was to be defined essentially in mili-
tary terms.35 Insofar as realism was informed by contractualism， it
was and had to be state-centric. Realists could accept neither re-
gional or global nor civil society institutions as security providers 
because these institutions could not be legitimised by contractualist 
means. Therefore， the lack of possibility of providing security 
through institutions above， below or beside the sovereign state be-
c伺amethe c∞or陀erealist a町r♂伊lmen批tagainst mu叫1辻lt凶i辺la叫te世r叫iおsm0町rm叫t“ip抑0圃
lar討it勿，yand regional i加nt旬egr叫iぬon.3甜6In consequence， the perceived secu-
rity concerns of states obtained priority over the “human" aspect of 
security in the course of the nineteenth century.訂
???
? ?
However， the realist assumptions are far from obvious. One problem 
is that the contractualism informing realism has enforced a rigorous 
though unjustified differentiation between domestic and interna-
tional security.38 Moreover， the state-centricity of realist interna-
tional theory has led to the postulate that the population groups in-
habiting the territory of the state should be united in one collective 
identity and should display a single loyalty to the institutions of 
that state whereas multiple loyalties attached to other institutions， 
should they persist， ought to be destroyed.39 Realists have catego-
rised states as“actors" speaking， as it were， with one voice.40 They 
have accepted the principal postulate that nation-states should be 
the only institutional framework for sovereign polities within which 
class distinctions and ethnic or gender discriminations can be over-
come and the democratically controlled rule of justice can be gu町"
anteed.41 This postulate has induced realists to equate statemaking 
with nation-building in the sense that the concoction of an inclusive 
“national" identity and the admission of only one loyalty to be fo-
cused solely on the institutions of the state. However， few states are 
in fact socially and politically integrated to a degree that ju師自es
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their classification as actors in the sense of realist theory. It is di任L
cult to perceive how a theoηcan be of service if one of its principal 
elements is difficult to reconcile with the empirical reality. But even 
more fundamentally， the belief that states are and， of right， should 
be the only legitimate integrated sovereign polities， has been ren-
dered unwarranted by the fact that communitarian ideologies42 and 
regional identities have persisted for a period that is much longer in 
most parts of the world than the temporal dimension within which 
states are on record to have existed.''l These ideologies and identi司
ties have enforced the continuity of multiple loyalties and govern-
ments of states have met with serious resistance in their attempts 
to constitu胎 themselvesas the only focal points of loyalty. Moreover， 
regional identities have tended to extend across international 
boundaries of sovereign states. Under these conditions， the realist 
demand has been rendered vain that the populations of sovereign 
states are and should be willing to act as united groups of people 
under the control of their governments， and the political demand 
has turned to be unrealistic that these populations should be will-
ing to bear the economic and human costs of the defence of their 
state. By contrast， admitting the pluralism of potentially competing 
loyalties and identities， the description of ongoing political processes 
may not only gain in adequacy but， more importantly， such proc-
esses as state succession can be analysed more appropriately as the 
results of long却 rmshifts in loyalties and identities rather than as 
abrupt collapses of institutions. Vice versa， regional integration 
processes may be understood as similar shifts that can but do not 
have to entail the destruction of existing state institutions. 
As one consequence of this revision of regional integration theory， 
security concerns can be connected with multiple identities and loy-
alties and can thus be focused on non-state and civil society institu-
tions which may appear more suitable as security providers. It may 
be remarked in this context that， up until the end of the eighteenth 
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century， non-government organizations such as churches and pri-
vate companies44 were accepted as regular providers of the human 
aspect of security together with governments. Only within the 
framework of ideologies of the nation-state did governments of sov-
ereign states assume the role of the sole providers of security at the 
disadvantage of the security concerns of the individual. Conse-
quently， institutions and schemes of regional integration do not 
have to be classed as security hazards but， instead， as one condition 
for the provision of security in the human dimension. 
???
? ?
V. The Widening Horizon of the Security Discourse 
The concept of security has undergone an unexpected change分om
the 1980s. Members of the Copenhagen School of security studies 
have become most vocal in articulating their position that the co任
cept of security should be widened substantively. This position has 
been informed by the observation that some of the seemingly well-
established realist assumptions about security do not in fact hold 
true. Security theorists have objected that there are ecological， mili-
tary and legal problems that， while impacting on the security of 
sovereign sta旬， demand for their solution transnational cooperation 
and international organization at regional levels or at the global 
level. There has been no doubt that ecological disasters， war and po・
litical instability can trigger mass migration and that sudden occur-
rences of mass migration can impact on the security of citizens and 
states. Moreover， the Kosovo War has shown that migration policy 
(in this case， the politics of purposeful mass expulsion) can be 
turned into a factor of military strategy under the goal of using 
mass migration to jeopardise the security of neighbouring states. 
However， security theorists are divided over the question what kind 
of institutions can deal with such problems. Only a minority of 
theorists has been willing to place international organisations and 
regional institutions in charge of handling them. Instead， the m勾or-
七10 
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ity of theorists， including members of the Copenhagen School， have 
opted for the govemments of soverei伊 statesas the sole agents 
equipped with the power and the legitimacy to deal with them coop-
eratively. 
Ano出er，more fundamental objection against the realist security 
discourse has emerged仕omthe request that the principal unit of 
security should not be the state or some other form of polity but the 
individual. Supporters of the request have argued that justice and 
equality follow 企omthe respect for personhood rather than the rec-
ognition of nationality and can only be established and maintained 
if the needs and desires of the individual are taken seriously as 
matters of public policy.'5 Supporters of the request have been found 
in a variety of camps， ranging from the activists around the Hague 
Appeal for Peace， who were at the core of the anti-WTO protests in 
Seattle in 1999， tomigration researchers who suggest that undocu・
mented immigrants should be granted basic human rights even 
though they have been found to have violat泡dvalid laws， and that 
migration policies are illegitimate which do not reco伊 isean indi岡
vidual's right to immigrate. Moreover， an increasing number of se-
curity theorists have betrayed their willingness to consider Mahbub 
ul-Haq's request that security should be defined in terms of the 
safety of the individual against starvation， loss of property， viola-
tions of bodily integrity， torture and other forms of aggression to・
gether with the protection of the integrity of states. The demands of 
these activists and theorists thus suggest a paradigm shift from 
sta旬 securityto human security as the more comprehensive secu-
rity concept that combines the security interests of the individual 
with those of the state. 
While the paradigm shi氏inthe background of the widening of the 
concept of security is of utmost political significance in the current 
wor1d， as， among others the demonstrations in Seattle in 1999 and 
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the responses旬 theattacks on New York and Washington in 2001 
make clear， itis more important in theoretical and historical con-
texts to provide an answer to the question whether or not the wid-
ening of the security discourse is a new process， unique at the turn 
of the twenty-first century. The most widely accepted perception is 
that the process began in the 1980s and has been fuelled by the 
several cases of state succession in the 1990s， the tripling of PKOs 
since 1988 from 13 in the period between 1948 to 1987 to 39 from 
1988 to 2000， the increasing vulnerability of civilian non-
combatants in military conf1icts， with the number of civilian war 
casualties rising from 10% of the total of the war dead in World 
War 1 to more than 90% of the total of the war dead in the Bosnian 
War， and， last but not least， the deepening sense of the urgency of 
the prevention of further global ecological devastation. However， 
much as these indicators are straightforward， the perception that 
concerns for what has been termed human security after Mahbub ul 
司Haqis not self-evident. The evidence that the notion of human se-
curity， not the word， may have a longer tradition behind it can be 
grouped into three categories: First， sources earlier than the 1980s 
show that human security concerns were on the agenda of diplo-
matic negotiations even though the word 'human security' was not 
then in use. Second， sources before the turn of the nineteenth cen刷
tury put on record that the protection of the individual was consid-
ered to be the prime task of rulers and a powerful means of con-
straining warfare. Third， sources of medieval origin disclose that 
the accomplishment of peace as a condition for the temporal secu-
rity of the individual and the perennial welfare of humankind was a 
demand enshrined in the ideologies of universalism and， in this re-
spect， the provision of human security was a religious concern. 
Sources of the first category can be discussed here in brief. It is well 
known that human security concerns were made explicit as early as 
in the Mouraviev Memorandum of 1898 beginning a series of diplo-
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matic negotiations that lead to convocation of the Hague Peace Con-
ference of 1899.16 There are further traces of the notion of human 
security in Mitrany's peace proposal of 1943.17 Recent reinvestiga-
tions into the Helsinki process have yielded proof that al major 
items enshrined in Mahbub u1-Haq's notion of human security were 
already on the agenda of the negotiations leading to the conclusion 
of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975:8 Debates about the notion of hu-
man security in this forum were not always controversial although 
they were not always discussed in distinction 仕omcontroversial is“ 
sues， such as those concerning human rights. Moreover， they fea-
tured strong1y in a variety of reports by international commissions 
whose work followed the He1sinki Accord.'9 Therefore， the 1994 
UNDP report making official Mahbub ul-Haq's definition， concluded 
a process that had already began at the very end of the nineteenth 
centuηr and had then consolidated itself for some twenty years 
when the term appeared in official records. 
? 、
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?
???
The second category of sources show that the conceptualisation of 
human security during the second half of the twentieth century has 
rep1aced another process which might be referred to as the militari-
sation of security and which began at the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury. This process is innately connected with the surge of nationa1-
ism and the militarisation of society in consequence of the French 
Revolution of 1789. Thus early nineteenth-century military theory 
provided the first general theory of war ever in a European context 
and defined war as a contest among“nations in arms円。 Thedialec-
tics of the buildup and reso1ution of friction and tensions appeared 
to demand the subordination of the interests of the individual to 
those of the nation as a who1e and to position the pursuit of na-
tional security as the sole ♂1arantee of the safety of the individual. 
Early nineteenth刷century1egal philosophers concurred and were 
most vocal in insisting that personhood was to be determined 
through nationality so that the persona1 identity of the individual 
12 
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should be a derivative of the national identity.51 It was thus a con・
sistent conclusion to request that the individual should be ready to 
risk his or her life in service to the nation， and， up to World War I， 
this request for sacrifice met with a surprising degree of popular ac-
ceptance.52 
However， twentieth-century theorists have been wrong in postulat-
ing that the demands of nineteenth-century military theorists and 
legal philosophers had made explicit perennial truths. This was not 
the case， first and foremost， because the concepts of nation and 
state underlying the request for sacrifice to the nation emerged in 
their current meanings only during the second half of the eight-
eenth century.53 Moreover， there is positive evidence that， up to the 
end of the eighteenth century， security had been defined in a 
broader sense than the mere protection against military attacks on 
states. Instead， the wide-ranging seventeenth幽 andeighteenth-
century theoretical tracts， diplomatic memoranda and administra-
tive records on the balance of power provide ample evidence for a 
notion of security that was integrated into the normative 企amework
of policy-making rules and legal as well as moral constraints 
against the sovereign war-making capability.54 Rules for the mainte-
nance of the balance of power were expressed in universalistic 
terms as norms that theorists claimed to have existed throughout 
history.55 The most elaborate eighteenth-century system of balance 
of power rules is contained in the work of Emerich de Vattel， the 
Swiss bom legal theorist who portrayed the balance of power in le-
gal rather than in political terms and insisted that breaches of bal-
ance of power rules were theoretical reasons for just warfare.56 How-
ever， Vattel argued in favour of an elaborate casuistry to be em-
ployed prior to any decision for war， and this casuistry required 
much observation on rulers' attitudes， the financial and political ca-
pabilities of govemments and the general wealth of populations so 
that， ineffect， even a breach of balance of power rules could hardly 
?????????
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serve as a reason for just warfare.57 Next to the legalism that Vattel 
favoured as the theoretical basis for balance of power rules， other 
theorists were more inclined to follow ethical ar:思lments.These 
theorists proceeded from the rationalist assumption that it was in 
the legitimate sel手interestof every ruler to act in fulfillment of 
moral obligations and to abide by the general principles of reason， 
and they requested caution and constraint in decisions to go to 
war.58 In either case， the salience of the maintenance of the balance 
of power was defended on the grounds that it was unjust to jeopard-
ise the life and safe勿 ofthe population subject to the control of a 
ruler and that upsetting the balance of power was ultimately not 
bene五cialto the ruler who， while ignoring the balance of power 
rules， was to face dissent and opposition from among the ruled， dev-
astation of the land， emigration of subjects， severe economic disad-
vantages and， last but not least， political isolation.開
??
? ?
These theoretical arguments were of importance not only in ar悶 ne
academic debates but also in practical politics. For example， inthe 
late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries， a large variety of 
rulers exploited the religious dissent which the French king Louis 
XN encountered仕omthe time of his revocation of the toleration 
edict for the Huguenot Calvinist minority in France in 1685. As， at
the same time， the French army forcefully expanded into neighbour-
ing territories rulers facing French expansionism counteracted by 
drawing large numbers of Huguenot refugees into their lands. The 
gain was twofold. First， many of the Huguenots were highly skilled 
craftspeople who added to the productivity in the areas of their im-
migration. Second， rulers attracting Huguenots from France into 
the territories under their control could use the migration to pro-
claim their rule as fair and just and could propagandistically cate-
gorise the Huguenot migration as an act of voting by the feet.60 Mi-
gration was ubiquitous because rulers faced insurmountable limita-
tions of their administrative capability to control emigration. Deser-
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tion was a normal affair， and rulers issued long series of edicts ban-
ning desertion. However， the repetitiveness of these edicts only ech-
oed the lack of executive power of their promoters， and military 
commanders had few means to prevent it beyond brutal punish-
ments that would usually put deserters to death. But， much as capi幽
tal punishments and harsh treatments were deterrents， they neces-
sarily resulted in the reduction of the military manpower， and this 
was not a desirable consequence. Hence， most rulers shared the 
conviction expressed by King Frederick I of Prussia， that a limited 
amount of desertion within the limits of what was common within 
al major armies was tolerable as it relieved armies from unreliable 
soldier・S.61In line with this reasoning， rulers encouraged the willing-
ness to desert from an enemy force by declaring their opponents' 
war aims as unjust and thereby tried to reduce the fighting power 
of their foes. The criteria of the justice of war aims were derived 
from balance of power rules. In consequence， the practical imple-
mentation of balance of power theories was a forceful constraint 
against the war-making capability of rulers. Few eighteenthゅcentury
rulers realised this consequence more directly than King Frederick 
I of Prussia. For his undeclared war against Austrian heiress Ma-
ria Theresa， which he launched in 1740， he paid dearly not only 
through direct war expenses but， more dramatically， through a 10ss 
of alliance剛makingcapability. Thus， down to the early 1760s， Fre-
derick could rely only on British subsidies and received scarce po-
litical support from anywhere whereas the Habsburg side could 
chose freely among a variety of possible alliance partners. The Aus-
trian eventually agreed to end the war not because Frederick's 
army should have been of superior military strength but because 
Frederick， in1763， was ready to acknowledge his obligation to play 
by the balance of power rules in the time to come.62 
Hence， concerns for the security of the individual became an issue 
of great importance also in military matters. Theorists assigned to 
?????????
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rulers the task of p1'oviding security to1' the population subject to 
thei1' cont1'ol and of creating a political， social and economic f1'ame-
wo1'k that could allow the pursuit of thei1' happiness. Stil at the 
end of the eighteenth centu1'Y， a latte1'-day physiocrat and leading 
reformer in the Roman Empire could define happiness as the core 
condition of stability."3 Along similar lines， Kant could articulate his 
hope that some hypothetical plan of nature should lead to the for-
mation of a cosmopolitan citizen日hipthat could grant equal rights 
to al humankind.o4 Mo1'eover， unlike in the sixteenth and the ear-
lier seventeenth centuries， when the ratio of the war dead in rel仕
tion to the total of combatants in battle could amount to about 50% 
。nthe side of the lose1'， eighteenth-centu1'Y military organisation 
made significant and successful eftorts to limit the carnage of battle 
p1'imarily because it was costly and difficult to replace well-trained 
soldie1's killed or turned invalid through battle action.6u Instead of 
using soldiers as cannon fodde1'， the capabilities of making soldiers 
execute given commands， preserving the Iife of the soldiers and of 
preventing them f1'om deserting in masses were considered the core 
of the achievement of successful military organisers.66 All this adds 
up to the perception that， p1'ior nineteenth century， the provision of 
secu1'ity had been a comp1'ehensive， not merely milita1'Y concept 
which had been a co1'e condition of the maintenance of stability and 
peace as well as a c1'ucial task fo1' 1'ule1's . 
?、 、
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Lastly， the thi1'd catego1'y of sources on the hi白to1'yof the concept of 
human secu1'ity suggests that this notion did not origin in the pa1'・
ticularistic political concerns of rulers of territorial polities but in 
the theological foundations of late medieval universalism. Late me-
dieval unive1'salism was cha1'acterised by a dualism of one divinely 
wi1led institution of unive1'sal rule ranked as the gua1'anto1' of the 
stability of the wo1'ld and a plethora of pa1'ticula1'istic polities 1'esult-
ing f1'om cont1'actual agreements between rulers and ruled.wi The 
unive1'salistic creed was eschatological in kind and positioned the 
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Roman Empire as the last of the world empires before Judgment 
Day. It was fundamental in shaping both the theory of empire and 
the practical conduct of imperial politic渇 inthe later Middle Ages 
because it demanded that emperors should accomplish the task of 
providing stabi1ity and security for the world in the dual sense of 
safety of individuals against hazards of daily life as well as safe-
guarding仕letranquillity of the world and securing the continuity of 
life after death. The combination of di貸'useeschatological hopes 
with manifest political and economic interests emerges from the 
multitude of late medieval political tracts on the origin and the end 
of the Roman Empire，68企omthe more principled treatises on politi-
cal philosophy written by Dante and Marsilius of Padua in the first 
half of the fourteenth century on the condition of a general peace69 
as well as 台。mthe widening scope of imperial and territorial peace 
legislation of the twelfth and the subsequent centuries.70 The de-
mand that emperors should be the foremost rulers to provide for 
peaω， stability and security in temporal as well as eschatological 
terms was thus imbued with religious values and， consequently， bi-
ased in favour ofthe Christian religion. Human security， inthis un-
derstanding， was a universal categorγonly in so far as it applied to 
Christian believers， whereas non.‘Christians， especially Muslims， as 
well as heretics， such as the Hussites， were excluded仕omthe de-
sired peace regimes and became the targets of the use of military 
violence or were subject to brutal persecution. Although the notion 
of divinely willed natural law was used in the theoηof war from 
the thirteenth century，71 it remained a theoretical construct with lit-
tle or no impact on the practical matters of human security beyond 
the confines of the Christian world. The 合equencyof the appeals to 
natural law and the preservation of peace in the later Middle Ages 
have to be judged against the background of the intensification of 
military activity and the rapid increase of the number of war dead 
and war-related expenses.官leoristscould do litle more than de-
plore these developments， while emperors appeared too weak to be 
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able to execute their tasks.72 It was only in the course of the six-
teenth century that the secularisation of political institutions pro-
moted the de圃institutionalisation佃 dethicisation of universalism.73 
These processes had the practical implication that the Roman Em-
pire ceased to be an administrative企ameworkfor universal rule 
and was transformed into a territorial polity like al others.74 Theo-
rists like Justus LipsiuS75 and Jean Bodin76 responded to these proc-
esses by redefining universalism as a set of norms and fundamental 
rules that they took加 followfrom the general principles of reason 
創ldto have validity without specific enforcement through human 
action.π It was only in consequence of the de-institutionalisation 
and ethicisation of universalism in the course of the sixteenth cen-
tury that the pursuit of human security could emerge as a demand 
of intemational law and担 applicationto al humankind. 
-'-，、
I have traced the history of the concept of human security very 
roughly backwards企omthe Helsinki Accord of 1975 to the later 
Middle Ages， as if， soto speak， totum the clock back. I have done 
so in order to show the changeability of the concept in its European 
context and in what appears to be a time span of about 900 years. 
The con四ptof human security reflects the experience of human in-
security together with the expectation that human insecurity can be 
tumed into human security through human efforts. Both， the in駒
creased sense of human insecurity and the increased demand for 
the provision of human security were a consequence of the intensifi-
cation of warfare during the high and late Middle Ages. Within the 
longue duree of litle less than a thousand years， the period of less 
than two hundred years during which the concept of security was 
militarised and focused on institutions of statehood rather than on 
human individuals as its prime units appears as an aberration. In 
the Middle Ages， the European concept of human security had been 
tied 初 auniversalistic institution with a strong bias in favour of 
Christianity. Whether it is stil so today might be decided on the ba-
? ?
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sis of a comparison between the legacies of universalism in Europe 
and the Atlantic World on the one side and， on the other， China and 
the island worlds of Western Pacific. 
VI. Conclusion 
If the sovereign state represents the triad of unities of population， 
government and territory， the frequently observed“decline of the 
state" has been caused not primari1y by economic activities and the 
patterns informing economic actions. Instead， the sovereign state 
has come under pressure because two of the three unities constitut-
ing it have been disclosed to be programmatic rather than factual. 
Rather than assuming that states comprise a united population (in 
the tradition of realism)， political theorists as well as practical 
decision噂makersin government have been forced to admit that mト
gration flexibilises the popu1ation and that the government capabil-
ity to counteract the flexibilising effects of migration are 1imited. 
Moreover， rather than perceiving resort to border surveillance and 
the resulting regional disintegration as proper means to counteract 
the flexibilising effects of migration， governments of sovereign 
states have been induced to contribute to schemes of regional inte-
gration or cooperate in institutions of regiona1 integration， a1though 
recognising that that institutions and schemes of regiona1 integra嗣
tion have the effect of flexibilising institutions of government. 
As a result， ithas become more difficu1t for governments of sover-
eign states to act as main or even as sole providers for domestic sta-
bi1ity and externa1 security. The term“we1fare state"， as Nicholas 
Onuf has recent1y remarked，78 has become an oxymoron and， that 
means in political terms， a nuisance. While the sovereign states 
have remained the sole legitimate providers of external security， the 
private sector through MNCs has emerged as a powerful competitor 
to the state as an agent for the provisiol1 of domestic stabi1ity. As 
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the private sector does not have to face legitimacy constraints and 
as it is not tied to serve its clientele only within the territory of only 
one state， iteasily becomes integrated into regional or even global 
networks that in turn reduce the range of activities of the govem-
ments of sovereign states. Likewise， organisations making up civil 
society (as this term is currently understood) through NGOs operate 
with an explicit intention of contributing to domestic stability and 
external security and thereby emerge as further checks against the 
activities of government of sovereign state臼.As transnational insti-
tutions， these MNCs and NGOs can， and frequently do， intervene 
into the domestic as well as international affairs of sovereign states 
at times of crisIs. Migration is a factor supporting if not originating 
these processes. Migrants may create transnational spaces within 
which MNCs， civil society organizations and regional institutions 
can operate. Consequently， regional integration cannot be conceptu-
alised on the basis of residentialist models of the state but must in-
corporate the flexibilising effects of migration. Moreover， the con-
cept of security has become inapt as a means to respond to the flexi-
bilisation of populations and government institutions of the sover幽
eign states as long as it is narrowly defined in terms of safety 
against military threats towards the state. Therefore， the comprゃ
hensive concept of human security is innately regional in kind. Gov幽
ernments of sovereign states have the choice between 1'edefining do自
mestic stability and external security along the idea and concept of 
comprehensive human security 01' live with a widening gap between 
the demand for the provision of security and the declining capabil-
ity and legitimacy to provide for it. 
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